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Dignity, History, and Religious-Group
Rights
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*
Alan Brownstein argues that neither "human dignity" nor 18th-century
history is sufficient to account for a "freedom of the Church" or other
freedom of religious association in the contemporary United States.'
Although some associations have a dignitary dimension, many (and perhaps
most) do not. Professor Brownstein's focus on human dignity gives
away the game: Corporations and associations are not human and thus
cannot.have "dignity" independent of their members.2 As for 18th-century
history, Brownstein shows that colonial, revolutionary, and early republican
attitudes were deeply and broadly anticlerical and anti-institutional.
Professor Brownstein's contribution is important. There is a common
tendency among both popular and academic commentators to assimilate
general 18th-century references to "religion" or "morality" or "nature's
God" to institutional as well as individual religious liberty. Brownstein
disabuses one of that tendency, persuasively showing that the 18th-century
history is actually consistent with two narratives, only one of which makes
place for a robust freedom of the church. A "freedom-of-the-church"
narrative recognizes "the decentralized and laity-controlled nature of
religious association in early colonial American," but also persistent
colonial and revolutionary efforts "to form religious associations and
* 0 2013 Frederick Mark Gedicks. Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law,
Brigham Young University Law School.
1. Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions, 21
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 201 (2013).
2. Brownstein, supra note 1, at Part II.
3. Brownstein, supra note 1, at Parts III & IV.
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develop structures in order to promote religious exercise," as in the training,
supervision and evaluation of ministers, and the institution of "outreach
and missionary efforts.4
A competing narrative, however, tells how individual religious liberty
was defended by severing the individual from religious groups "which
operate independently from, and are not accountable to, their members,"
which resonated with "struggles for congregational autonomy," "conflicts
between the laity and the clergy" over church governance, virulent anti-
Catholicism, association of "top-down hierarchical ecclesiastical structures
with religious oppression," and a general fear of wealth and power when
wielded by religious groups.5 As Brownstein concludes, the history relating
to institutional religious freedom in the colonial and early constitutional
eras should give an originalist "considerable pause" at the argument that
the original meaning of the Religion Clauses included something like a
"freedom of the church" from government control and interference." 6
I will restrict myself to two observations. I believe that dignity might
ground a freedom of the church, though protection of the church's dignity
will often come at the expense of that of its members. And as important
as the 18th century is to this discussion, the 19th century may be even more
crucial.
I. RELIGIOUS-GROUP DIGNITY
It is not obvious why religious institutions cannot suffer dignitary harm
analogous to the harm to human dignity that grounds individual religious
freedom. Dignitary harm, for example, was at the heart of the Mormon
church's argument in defense of the religious-employer exemption from
Title VII in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos.7 There the use
of tithing funds-voluntary member contributions to the church of 10%
of one's income, often made in the face of significant sacrifice and
hardship-to pay the salary of a Mormon employee who did not tithe
was understood by the church as an insult to its faithful members who do,
even though the employee was not directly engaged in religious work.'
4. Brownstein, supra note 1, at 266-67.
5. Brownstein, supra note 1, at 266.
6. Brownstein, supra note 1, at 270.
7. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding religious exemption from Title VII against
Establishment Clause challenge).
8. See Brief for Appellants at 19, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
[Some] of the money used to pay the salaries of [Deseret Gym] employees
comes directly from contributions by members of the Mormon Church. In spite
of church policy, the district court has ordered the church to use its monies to
pay the salaries of those who do not meet its standards.
274
[VOL. 21: 273, 2013] Religious-Group Rights
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
Requiring the church to use its tithing funds to pay the salary of a less
faithful or less committed member undercut the narrative of sacrifice that to
this day runs through Mormon religious practice.9
Consider a more prosaic (and wildly improbable) possibility. Suppose
that the Mormon church's flagship institution, Brigham Young University,
is somehow forced to open a bar on campus. No Mormon would be forced
to buy its alcoholic beverages, and no BYU employee would, but it would
nevertheless be institutionally demeaning to require that BYU-whose
sponsoring church prohibits consumption of alcohol as a matter of
faith-tolerate such behavior in the midst of its communal effort to
exemplify that faith.
This, I take it, is sort of the argument that some opponents of the
Affordable Care Act contraception-coverage mandate have made. 0 I
disagree that the mandate constitutes a legally cognizable burden on the
institutional free exercise of religious nonprofit or for-profit enterprises,"
Id. The employee was the custodial supervisor of a nonprofit health club operated by the
church for its members and employees.
9. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99, 113.
Mormons understand and interpret the story of their founding as one of
extraordinary personal sacrifice by early members in the face of violent
persecution. [] Contemporary Mormons continue to see their religion as a demanding
one. [] In the eyes of the church, to use tithing donations to support the economic
livelihood of an unfaithful Mormon would dishonor both the sacrifice of those
who pay tithing and the memory of the sacrifices of their pioneer forebears.
Id.
10. See, e.g., Daniel Philpott, Why Christians Cannot Just "Lighten Up" Over the
HHS Mandate, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2012), http://berkleycenter.
georgetown.edu/rfp/essays/why-christians-cannot-just-lighten-up-over-the-hhs-mandate ("To
force a Catholic university, which by definition commits itself to manifesting the teachings of
the Catholic Church, to promote [the use of contraceptives] is to force it to compromise
its very witness to the character of life lived in fellowship with the resurrected Christ-indeed
as this life might be lived by its own employees."); cf Brownstein, supra note 1, at 270
("[Rjeligious communities experience a special kind of dignitary affront when the govemment
commandeers resources assigned to, and donated for, the fulfillment of spiritual obligations
in order to further the state's secular purposes.").
11. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from
the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation ofReligion, 49 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2014), available at http://ssm.com/id=2328516;
Frederick Mark Gedicks, With Liberty for All: A Defense of the Affordable Care Act's
Contraception Coverage Mandate, 6 ADVANCE: TiHE JOURNAL OF THE ACS ISSUE GROUPS
135 (Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Advance_
Volume_6_Fall_ 2012.pdf
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but not because corporate and other group entities are incapable of suffering
dignitary harms.
Professor Brownstein calls for clarification and support for "the
connection between personal dignity and institutional autonomy."1 2
Clarification, however, would make clear that protection of institutional
dignity often comes at the expense of human dignity. This is the paradox
of groups in liberal democracy: Forceful insistence that groups exist and
possess rights independent of their members protects members against
state oppression, but leaves them exposed to group oppression when group
rights shield the group from government intervention.13 Amos itself
illustrates that this game is often zero-sum: Vindication of the exemption
from Title VII protected the Mormon church's dignitary interest in
avoiding the use of tithing funds to pay the salaries of unfaithful or less
committed members, but at the expense of those members' livelihoods.
II. 19TH-CENTURY HISTORY
The standard reflex when one recurs to the history of church and state
is return to the founding era of the late- 18th century. One has to start
somewhere, and the chronological beginning is hard to criticize. The
Religious Clauses were drafted and ratified in the 18th century and
constituted a remarkable innovation in western government, a "lustre to
our country," in Madison's memorable phrase popularized by Judge
Noonan.14
The problem is not that we usually start with the 18th century, but that
we too often never leave it. As Justice Marshall ironically but truthfully
emphasized, the current shape of our constitutional law and our country
generally owes far more to the Reconstruction Amendments than it does
to the oft-celebrated 18th-century founding.15 The more important historical
12. Brownstein, supra note 1, at 270.
13. Gedicks, supra note 9, at 115-22.
14. JOHN THOMAS NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 4 (1998) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 1 9 (1785), available at http://religious
freedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison-m&r_1 785.html (arguing that the proposed
assessment bill departed from the United States's "generous policy" of religious equality,"
which, offering an Asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion,
promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the number of its citizens")).
15. Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1987) (arguing that the 1787 Constitution was
"defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social
transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the
individual freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today").
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action on the freedom of the church, I believe, is in the 19th and early-
20th centuries.
Founding-era anticlericalism persisted through the 19th century and
well into the 20th. It is, for example, adapted to the anti-Mormonism that
animated the Republican Party from its birth.16 That animus was of course
generated by polygamy, but also by the Mormons' corporatist, unified-
bloc politics which were dictated by a single hierarchical cleric.' 7 An
anti-religious institutionalism-in truth, an unvarnished anti-Catholicism--
is also evident in the attempts by James G. Blaine and others to specify
the content of the general anti-establishment norm applied against the
states by the 14th Amendment.' 8
Perhaps the most important development during the 19th century was
the Court's off-handed, almost thoughtless inclusion of corporations within
the definition of "persons" protected by the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amendment.' 9 This not only ushered in
the Lochner era that protected economic and other rights with the
16. Republican Platform of 1856, http://www.ushistory.org/gop/convention_1856
republicanplatform.htm ("[I] it is both the right and the imperative duty of Congress to
prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism Polygamy, and Slavery.").
17. See, e.g., LEONARD ARRINGTON, BRIGHAM YOUNG: AMERICAN MOSES 223-72
passim (1984) (detailing numerous instances in which Mormon prophet Brigham Young
exercised autocratic power over Mormons and against federal authorities in territorial
Utah); SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 6-7, 228 (2002) (describing
how anti-polygamists found Mormons fundamentally anti-democratic).
18. See generally Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM.
J. LEG. HIST. 38 (1992); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption ofthe Establishment Clause:
The Rise ofthe Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995).
Named after James G. Blaine, an anti-Catholic Speaker of the House with presidential
ambitions, the Blaine Amendment would have provided:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor,
nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any
religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided
between religious sects or denominations.
4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875). The proposed Amendment was widely viewed as an effort to
blunt growing Roman Catholic political influence, particularly Catholic efforts to obtain
public funding for parochial schools. See Green, supra, at 51 n.84, 54 & n.107; Lash,
supra, at 1147-48.
19. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889); Santa Clara
v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (announcement at oral argument).
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still-controversial doctrine of "substantive due process,"20 but it survived
that era to enable powerful protection of corporate and group interests
today,21 including religious group interests.22
In short, it is likely that pairing 19th century history with the founding-era
history Professor Brownstein has already uncovered would further expose
the shallow roots of contemporary religious-group rights in American
constitutional history, together with the difficulty of defending them on
originalist grounds.
20. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897) (holding corporation
entitled to due-process liberty protection of unenumerated fundamental rights); Chicago,
Burlington & Qunicy R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 262-63 (1897) (holding corporation
entitled to just compensation for municipal taking of property as element of due-process
liberty).
21. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (recognizing Speech
Clause rights in corporations); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (same).
22. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694 (2012) (recognizing broad exception to anti-discrimination laws when religious
congregations hire and fire leaders).
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